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Technological development and concentration of stock
exchanges in Europe




This paper provides an explanation of technical inefficiencies of financial
exchanges in Europe as well as an empirical analysis of their existence and extent.
A single-stage stochastic cost frontier approach is employed, which generates
exchange inefficiency scores based on a unique unbalanced panel data set for all
major European financial exchanges over the period 1985–1999. Overall cost
inefficiency scores reveal that European exchanges operate at 20–25% above the
efficiency benchmark. The results also affirm that size of exchange; market
concentration and quality; structural reorganisations of exchange governance;
diversification in trading service activities; and adoption of automated trading
systems significantly influence the efficient provision of trading services in
Europe. Over the sample period, European exchanges notably improved their
ability to efficiently manage their production and input resources.
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Euroopan pörssien keskittyminen ja tekninen kehitys




Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan Euroopan pörssien teknistä tehokkuutta. Lisäksi
pohditaan vaihtoehtoisia hypoteeseja, joiden on katsottu selittävän pörssien mah-
dollista tehottomuutta. Tehottomuuksien mittaamisessa sovelletaan yhden vaiheen
stokastisten kustannuspintojen menetelmää. Tutkimuksen ainoalaatuinen havain-
toaineisto koostuu Euroopan keskeiset pörssit kattavasta paneelista vuosilta 1985–
1999. Tutkimustulosten mukaan Euroopan pörssien kustannukset ovat keskimää-
rin 20–25 % suuremmat kuin mittapuuna käytetty tehokkuusnormi. Tulokset vah-
vistavat myös käsitystä, että pörssin koko, markkinoiden keskittyminen ja toimi-
vuus, pörssien hallintajärjestelmien organisointi, kaupankäyntiin liittyvän palvelu-
toiminnan hajautuminen sekä automaattisten kaupankäyntijärjestelmien käyttöön-
otto vaikuttavat merkittävästi siihen, miten tehokkaasti Euroopan pörssit tuottavat
kaupankäyntiin liittyviä palveluja. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että Euroopan pörssit
ovat tuotantotoiminnassaan kyenneet huomattavasti parantamaan käytettävissä
olevien resurssien hallintaa viimeisen viidentoista vuoden aikana.
Asiasanat: Eurooppa, pörssit, paneeliaineisto, tekninen tehokkuus
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This study deals with the microstructure of the securities industry in Europe by
analysing empirically the existence, extent and explanation of inefficiency effects
among all major European financial exchanges. Integration of European financial
services and capital markets is believed to have significant long-term benefits
arising from improved capital allocation, more efficient intermediation of savings
to productive investments, and the strengthening of EU economy (The Committee
of Wise Men (2000) and (2001)). This is the major motivation that led monetary
and fiscal authority traditionally articulate prime interest in European and global
financial market developments. The European security industry experiences a
period of great and rapid change, which is driven by three fundamental forces.
First, the risk factor of exchange rate changes in the Euro area has been removed
with the introduction of a common European currency. Second, the imposition of
the Investment Service Directive abandoned considerable restrictions in European
financial markets as it provides financial intermediaries with the “single passport”
allowing them to benefit from favourable stock trading conditions at any
European market regardless of their physical location. Third, in a global context
advances in sophisticated communication and information technologies are
reducing trading costs and are accelerating the production process of financial
services (Hasan, Malkamäki, and Schmiedel (2001)). These far-reaching
structural changes in European financial markets stimulate more effectively inter-
exchange competition. This paper addresses these developments affecting the
structure of European equity markets and it anticipates potential efficiency
improvements arising from further consolidation and concentration of the
industry.
The paper pursues a number of research issues concerning the microstructure
of exchanges: the first is whether providers of trading services are organised
efficiently? If this is not the case, what is the level of inefficiency that financial
exchanges are facing relative to the best practice exchange and to which extent
efficiency gains might arise from consolidation and concentration of stock
exchanges in Europe? How does inefficiency among exchanges evolve over time?
What determines exchange inefficiency and which are the characteristics
explaining inefficiencies in the organisational structure and provision of trading
activities?
While efficiency research to date has been extensively carried out in the
context of bank performance and determinants of banking efficiencies (Berger and
Humphrey (1997)), efficiency effects among exchanges have not been researched
so far. Existing evidence relates to economies of scale and score in stock
exchanges (Hasan and Malkamäki (2001)). As noticed by Hasan and Malkamäki
(2001), a plausible explanation for this neglected research field is the
unavailability of consistent panel data on key balance sheet items across stock
exchanges. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature and to
contribute to the discussion about the future of stock exchanges by estimating
technical efficiencies of European stock exchanges in a stochastic frontier
framework. Domowitz and Steil (1999) claim that traditional literature on
financial market structures mainly focuses on explicit trading rules, mechanisms,
and on their impact on the price discovery process, but less work has been carried
out on the economics of exchanges themselves. To have a better understanding of8
the functioning of the security trading industry this paper examines the
organisation of financial exchange markets from a supply-sided perspective.
Following Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin, and Netter (1999) as well as Domowitz and
Steil (1999) stock exchanges are considered herein as operative firms which offer
trading products and embody particular technologies. The key hypothesis of this
analysis is that although inefficiency effects in the provision of trading services by
European stock exchanges might have declined over time, inefficiencies still
remain on a considerable high level.
A unique unbalanced panel data set is constructed, consisting of all major
European financial exchanges over the time period 1985–1999. Using a single-
stage econometric frontier approach (Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)), Coelli, Rao
and Battese (1998)), the paper estimates simultaneously stochastic frontier
functions incorporating inefficiency effects of European stock exchanges and
examines potential correlates helping to explain deviations from the efficient
frontier.
The overall findings exhibit evidence that European exchanges’ inefficiency
scores are 20–25 per cent higher than the predicted benchmark. Improvements in
efficiency among exchanges over the sample period are to be found in association
with a number of exchange-specific characteristics. The results indicate that size
of exchanges, market concentration and quality, diversification in other trading
activities, emergence of sophisticated trading technologies, as well as changes of
exchanges governance structures play a dominant role in the efficient provision of
trading services in European stock exchange industry.
In order to benefit from a fully integrated European financial services and
capital market, the results support the need for a more efficient security-trading
infrastructure and for consolidation of the present fragmented security trading
landscape at the European level. In this respect, one major challenge for European
financial regulators will be to create and ensure a stable European regulatory
system that is flexible enough to adjust adequately to future technological and
market developments. First advances in this discussion has been achieved by a
recent agreement on a new legislative process for European security markets
based on the reports of the Committee of Wise Men (2001). Against the
background of recent trends in the global and European economic environment,
future nation-wide and cross-border consolidation, alliances and mergers, take-
overs of financial exchanges are likely to be forthcoming in Europe.
The structure of the remainder is as follows. In section 2, the discussion of
prior empirical and theoretical literature on financial markets structure provides
the background for this study. Section 3 highlights recent developments in stock
and derivative exchange industry. The stochastic frontier methodology and the
functional specifications of the frontier models employed in this paper are defined
in section 4. Section 5 describes the data set and deals with the selection of
relevant variables. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 6.
The paper ends by drawing conclusions in section 6.9
2 Relevant literature
In the literature on efficiency, a considerable amount of research has been carried
out about the empirical estimation of financial institution efficiency, primarily in
the context of depository institutions as well as firms in the insurance industry.
Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey the results of 130 studies of financial
institution efficiency covering 21 countries based on five different frontier
efficiency approaches. Overall evidence of the reviewed studies suggests
efficiency estimates near 80 per cent using both, parametric and non-parametric,
frontier techniques. Although extensive evidence exists on different types of
financial institutions, no study can be detected so far which benchmarks
empirically the relative performance of financial exchanges.
In a broader context, some studies examine important changes in global
financial markets evaluating causes, consequences, and future prospects for
financial sector consolidation and emphasise the relevance of geographic patterns
of financial activities (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)), The Committee of
Wise Men (2001), Group of Ten (2001), OECD (2001). In particular, a recent
OECD study (2001) describes the forces shaping structural changes in financial
markets. The authors anticipate the development towards a future single global
market by the mean of interconnected national equity markets as a potential
outcome of rapidly proceeding market globalisation and technological advances.
They argue in favour of a remaining coexistence of national local trading places
for less-liquid financial products. However, problems may arise as their role is no
longer unchallenged by international rival markets and thus the importance of
smaller, marketplaces is expected to diminish over time.
Consistent with these developments, Gehrig (2000) models the implications
of technological advances for the location of financial activities. Distinguishing
between complex local and straightforward generally available information, he
argues that the latter can easily be transferred through electronic networks while
the former requires face-to-face interactions, i.e. when individuals make contracts
bearing confidential contents. These two informational categories have different
repercussions on financial centres. Certain financial services in particular those
activities of the value chain consisting of a high degree of simple and standardised
information can be shifted to lower-cost peripheral regions. In contrast, non-
standardised financial activities that depend on complex information exchanges
between market participants are best performed in front offices with an immediate
local access to market information. Following Gehrig (2000) the relevance of
geography for financial activities will persist even for stock exchanges at the
national level conditionally on their ability of aggregating local non-standardised
complex information.
A similar viewpoint derives from studies that emphasise the location of
information as being a central element for the distribution of international capital
flows and trading performances. Brennan and Cao (1997) construct a model of
international equity portfolio flows based on the assumption of geographic
information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors. In the case that
domestic investors enjoy a cumulative information advantage over foreign
investors about their domestic market, investors tend to purchase foreign assets in
periods when the return on foreign assets is high and tend to sell when the return
is low. Considering a gravity model, Portes and Rey (2000) explore determinants10
of cross-border asset transaction in major equity markets. The results show that
bilateral gross asset flows are especially suited to market size and distance as a
proxy for informational asymmetries. Other information variables that bear
explanatory power include proxies for information transmission, insider trading,
and transaction technology. According to their findings, a negative relationship
between asset trade and distance is strongly associated with informational
asymmetries. Hau (2001) investigates international informational barriers across
the trading population. He reports that geographical information asymmetries are
main determinants of trading performance differences.
Related to the financial centre literature, Martin and Rey (2000) analyse on a
theoretical level the effects of financial integration on asset flows, risk
diversification and the breath of financial markets. In particular, they focus on the
impact of cross-border listings on the cost of capital and on financial geography
when financial markets become integrated implying a decline in transaction costs.
Depending on the underlying cost structure of cross-border listings or equity
trade, their model suggests that financial integration encourages the issue of
shares on the largest markets of the integrated area. If financial integration implies
decreasing fixed cost of issuing abroad within the integrated area smaller
economies are then also likely to gain market shares and to benefit from financial
integration.
In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the trading of foreign stocks
as investors realise the necessity for international diversification and as foreign
companies seek to broaden their shareholder base and raise capital (Domowitz,
Glen, Madhavan (1998)). Evidence on cross-border listing decisions supports the
view that geography in finance still maters. Pagano, Röell, and Zechner (1999)
examine companies’ cross-listing decisions from a firm-specific perspective. They
observe the overall tendency that European companies have increasingly listed
abroad, especially on U.S. exchanges over the considered time period, while
listings of U.S. companies in the EU have declined. They find evidence that
European companies listing on the transatlantic exchange reveal characteristics of
high-growth, export-oriented, and high-tech industries. Apart from a few common
features concerning size, high-foreign sale, and high R&D expenditure, inter-
Europe cross-listing companies appear to differ considerably from those, being
present on U.S. stock markets. In a subsequent empirical analysis, Pagano, Randl,
and Röell (2001) demonstrate that European companies prefer to be cross-listed in
more liquid and larger markets, as well as in markets with a relative high number
of listed companies of the same industry. Furthermore, cross-listing decisions also
seem to be positively related to markets offering better investor protection, more
efficient courts and bureaucracy.
There is only little research available that addresses international comparisons
of financial exchanges themselves. In contrast to classical financial market
studies, Domowitz and Steil (1999) emphasise important effects of advances in
automated trading technologies on operating costs and the organisational structure
of an exchange, rather than focusing on transactions costs that traders face. By
modelling aspects of the organisation of financial exchanges, Pirrong (1999)
concludes that the existence of scale economies in the provision of trading
infrastructure encourages co-operation and consolidation among financial trading
services. In an earlier study on scale economies in security markets, Doede (1967)
reports that the average operating costs of stock exchanges are a declining
function of trading volume. In a closely related study Demsetz (1968) observes11
that bid-ask spreads are a declining function of the rate of transaction volume.
Both approaches indicate evidence on economies of scale in exchange operations
and in the market making of a particular security, respectively. In a game-
theoretic framework, Di Noia (2001) addresses possible effects of cross-network
externalities on competition and consolidation in the European stock exchange
industry. It is demonstrated that competition may lead to inefficient equilibria
while an implicit merger may have a Pareto optimal outcome and result in higher
profitability of both exchanges. The implicit merger model shows that
specialisation in listing or trading services among exchanges is likely. By
analysing the effects of U.S. exchange mergers on trading volume and execution
costs, Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin, and Netter (1999) find that merging exchanges
attracted market share and experienced narrower bid-ask spreads.
Malkamäki and Topi (1999) analyse driving forces of the changes in the
market structures for financial exchanges and securities settlement systems. They
argue that economies of scale and scope and network effects will foster cross-
border competition among exchanges. Furthermore, Hasan and Malkamäki (2001)
investigate empirically the existence of economies of scale and scope among
exchanges providing separate perspectives of different regions. They find
evidence indicating substantial higher economies of scale and scope in North
American and European exchanges in comparison to Asian and South American
exchanges. Comparing descriptive statistics of total costs to total revenues of
eleven European stock exchanges over 1993–1994, Cybo-Ottone, Di Noia, and
Murgia (2000) observe that efficiency differences are likely to exist across the
sample exchanges. However, these studies do not provide empirical support for
the determination of efficiency levels among exchanges and factors that may
explain variations from the efficient reference.
Against the background of the ongoing consolidation of the financial sector,
rapid technological developments, a changing regulatory environment pointing
towards increasing competition and concentration of stock exchanges, this study
is important for a better understanding of financial exchanges functioning and
structure. In particular for the European area, these developments appear to be
quite acute. However, the reviewed literature lacks a comprehensive panel based
benchmark analysis for European security industry. This paper attempts to fill this
gap. Adopting a supply-sided viewpoint, this study presents novel insights in the
efficient organisation and structure of exchange markets in Europe. The purpose
of the paper is to consider whether and if so to what extent inefficiency problems
exist in European exchanges. In addition, the paper asks how exchanges’ relative
efficiency has evolved over time and which factors might explain deviations from
the efficient benchmark. Using a unique panel data set for all major European
exchanges for the period 1985–1999, this paper employs multi-product, translog
cost frontier functions, in which the technical inefficiency effects are modelled in
terms of exchange-specific characteristics.12
3 ‘Co-ompetition’ among financial exchanges
The term ‘co-ompetition’ is used in order to describe the trend of increasing co-
operation and competition among exchanges pointing towards concentration of
stock exchanges in Europe as a potential outcome of continuing globalisation,
innovations in communication and trading technologies, as well as deregulation.
Against this background, financial exchanges reorganise their operations and
form alliances in order to leverage themselves in a stronger competitive position.
The figure A-1 illustrates the complexity and inter-connections of Europeans
current securities trading landscape. It seems evident that financial exchanges
follow different ways to cope with investor’s demands of lower trading costs,
improved liquidity and immediate access to international trading. Consistent with
OECD (2001), four different models of inter-exchange co-operation can be
identified from figure A-1. A first strategy is promoted by NASDAQ. The basic
idea is to establish branches with local partners using a common technology to
have access to regional markets. Prominent examples are NASDAQ Europe,
NASDAQ Canada, and NASDAQ Japan. The objective is to build up inter-
connected hubs for a global electronic 24/7 marketplace. A second type includes
mergers among exchanges, i.e. the recent merger Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam
under the name Euronext, or the ill-fated London Stock Exchange and Deutsche
Börse merger attempt. Here the purpose is to achieve actively economies of scale
by concentrating trading on one stock exchange with a common trading system. A
third strategy is the attempted hostile take-over bid pursued by the Swedish OM
Group for the London Stock Exchange. Finally, a fourth design of exchange co-
operation is portrayed by the New York Stock Exchange. This attempt seeks to
interconnect leading equity exchanges in a Global Equity Market (GEM) by the
means of a shared common electronic interface.
In derivative markets, Globex Alliance and Eurex have already pooled trading
activities in a de facto interconnected single electronic trading platform. Globex
Alliance as a world global electronic trading system offers remote trading access
to its interconnected member exchanges. Under the Globex Alliance, participants
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Euronext (formerly ParisBourse,
Singapore Exchange Derivatives Trading (SGX), Brazil’s Bolsa de Mercadorias
& Futuros (BM&F), Spains MEFF, and the Bourse de Montréal benefit from
remote access to all the Alliance markets by a single electronic trading system.
The Eurex exchange was jointly launched by the German Deutsche Börse AG
and the Swiss Exchange by the merger of the formerly DTB Deutsche
Terminbörse und SOFFEX (Swiss Options and Financial Futures Exchange) in
1996. Eurex provides direct electronic access to a wide range of derivative
products. In terms of trading volume, the rapid emergence of Eurex relative to UK
based London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), affirms that cost
efficiency and the importance of network economics play a dominant role in the
efficient microstructure of trading systems.
There are also substantial economic forces of fragmentation at work, which
limit the extent of consolidation of financial institutions within Europe. In a recent
study, Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2001) claim that efficiency barriers, in
particular distances between nations, linguistic and cultural differences, or
implicit rules against foreign institutions, may inhibit the creation of an EU-wide
single market for financial services and institutions. Although the Single Market13
Programme and European Monetary Union remove some of these restrictions for
EU nations and for the EMU member countries, the remaining obstacles may
make it difficult to exploit all advantages of potential efficiency gains arising from
a consolidated EU market for financial services.
Despite ongoing formation of alliances, ultimately mergers, or letter of intents
to create joint and specialised market segments, further concrete progress in the
consolidation process is required and is likely to be forthcoming in Europe. In the
following, the paper evaluates potential efficiency gains that may occur from
future changes in the organisation of European exchange markets.
4 Methodology
The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) literature makes significant contributions to
the econometric modelling of production and the estimation of technical
efficiency of firms. Econometric SFA models incorporate a two-component error
structure. One part of the error term is associated with traditional random and
uncontrollable factors, and the second component captures individual firm
deviations or errors due to factors within the control of management, such as
technical and allocative efficiency. By estimating the ratio of the variability for
the two separated error terms, the level of technical inefficiency for each
observation in the sample can be quantified.
1
4.1 Stochastic cost frontier
In terms of the specific estimation technique in this paper, different stochastic cost
frontiers using panel data and incorporating technical inefficiency effects are
formulated, following Battese and Coelli (1995). The most notable features of this
stochastic cost frontier approach are that it accommodates unbalanced panel data,
or pooled time-series, cross-sectional data, and that it estimates in a single stage
both the cost frontier and the coefficients of firm-specific variables that may
explain deviations from the efficient cost frontier.
Several studies adopt a two-stage approach, in which a stochastic frontier is
estimated in the first stage, and obtained efficiencies are then regressed against a
vector of firm-specific variables in a second stage. However, one of the reasons to
argue against the two-step formulation is that the underlying assumptions are
clearly inconsistent with those of the stochastic frontier estimation. For example,
it is assumed in the first stage that the inefficiencies are independent and
identically distributed, but this assumption is contradicted in the second-stage
regression, in which predicted efficiencies are assumed to a have a functional
relationship with the firm specific characteristics. More recent studies address this
problem and adopt a single stage approach, in which explanatory variables are
incorporated directly into the inefficiency error component. This approach
assumes that the inefficiency error component is a truncation at zero of a normal
distribution with the mean being dependent on a vector of firm-specific variables.
                                                
1 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998) provide a survey of literature on
econometric approaches to efficiency estimation.14
Battese and Coelli (1995) propose a model that allows for panel data and in which
inefficiency effects are defined to be an explicit function of some firm-specific
factors and a random error. All relevant parameters are estimated in a single-stage
maximum-likelihood procedure.
The preferred model of a stochastic frontier cost function for panel data is
defined as follows
T ,..., 1 t and N ,..., 1 i and X TC it it it = = ε + β = (4.1)
where TCit denotes the logarithm of the total cost of production for the i–th firm
(i = 1, ..., N) for the t–th time period (t = 1, ..., T), Xit is a (1× K) vector whose
values are functions of inputs, outputs and other explanatory variables associated
with the i–th observation at the t–th period of observation, β  represents a (K× 1)
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and ε it is a disturbance term.
T ,..., 1 t and N ,..., 1 i and u v X TC it it it it = = + + β = (4.2)
The disturbance term, ε it, in equation (4.1) can be decomposed into two influences
as defined in equation (4.2). The vit’s are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed  ) , 0 ( N
2
v σ  random errors, which have normal distribution
with mean zero and unknown variance 
2
v σ , the uit’s are non-negative unobservable
random variables accounting for the cost of inefficiency in production and are
assumed to be independently distributed. The latter is obtained by truncation at
zero of the normal distribution with mean, zitδ , and variance 
2
u σ , that is
) , ( N
2
u it σ µ
+ , where  δ = µ it it z,  z it represents a (1× M) vector of firm-specific
variables that are allowed to vary over time, and δ  an (M× 1) vector of unknown
coefficients of the firm-specific inefficiency variables.
The information that the error term, ε it, contains on uit can be extracted by
using the conditional mean of the inefficiency term, given the composed error
term, as originally proposed by Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner,
Lovell, and Schmidt (1977). Accordingly, the best operational predictor of the
inefficiencies is the mean of this conditional distµribution for the half-normal
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where the total variance is 
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v s ) ( σ + σ ≡ σ ,  v u /σ σ ≡ λ , φ (.) and Φ (.) are the
standard normal density and the cumulative normal density function,
respectively.
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For the Battese and Coelli (1995) frontier model, the null hypothesis, that
technical inefficiency effects are absent from the model, can be conducted by
                                                











u /σ σ ≡ γ . Further details are presented in the appendix of
Battese and Coelli (1993).15
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versus  0 : H1 > γ . Under the null hypothesis that the second-order coefficients and
the cross terms in the translog function are zero tests whether the Cobb-Douglas
frontier is an adequate representation of the data. Also, the null hypothesis that the
technical inefficiency effects are not influenced by the level of the explanatory
variables can be tested by  0 : H0 = δ  against  0 : H1 > δ , where δ  denotes the vector
of coefficients of the exchange-specific inefficiency variables included in the
expression, zitδ . These formal hypotheses tests are performed using generalised
likelihood-ratio statistics.
To obtain maximum likelihood estimates of a common efficiency frontier and
of the technical inefficiency effects model of Battese and Coelli (1995), two
further a priori specifications are therefore required. These comprise the selection
of an appropriate underlying cost function and the identification of the firm-
specific variables.
4.2 Multiproduct cost function
A commonly used translog functional form is employed to examine the
underlying cost structure and to benchmark the performance of European stock
and derivative exchanges. The translog cost model has the appealing virtues that it
accommodates multiple outputs and that it is flexible enough to provide a second-
order approximation to any well-behaved underlying cost frontier at the mean of
the data (Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)). The general functional form of the
translog cost function is defined as
























h 0 it it it it








X ln Q ln P ln




Q ln Q ln
2
1
Q ln ) T , X , P , Q ( TC ln
+ + ω + ψ + ρ +
τ + τ + λ + κ +
ξ + ξ + η +
β + β +







The total costs, TCit, depend on the vector of output, Qit, the vector of factor
prices, Pit, the stock market performance, Xit, and a time variable, T, for each
exchange i and time period t.
3 The technical inefficiency effects are captured by
the inefficiency term uit, as discussed above. Finally, to control for measurement
errors and cost determinants beyond the control of management, the second
random term vit is added.
To ensure symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices, equation (4.4) is
reformulated by imposing the usual restrictions
                                                
3 See section 5 for detailed information on the data and variables.16
lk kl jh hj and β = β α = α










k ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ = δ = λ = δ = β = β
This normalisation is achieved by scaling total costs, price of capital, and input
cross terms by the price of labour input, arbitrarily chosen. The translog cost
function is then defined as

























it it it it








X ln Q ln P ln








) T , X , P , Q ( TC ln
+ + ω + ψ + ρ +
τ + τ + λ + κ +
ξ + ξ + η +
β + β +








where  n ,..., 1 j , h =  and  1 p ,..., 1 l , k − =  and  pit it it P / TC TC = ,  pit kit kit P / P P = ,
pit lit l P / P P = .
5 Data and variables
The data used in this study come from a variety of sources, including annual
reports of European exchanges, various issues of the International Federation of
Stock Exchanges (FIBV), IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), and
information from exchanges Internet sites. Most of the data were collected from
annual balance sheets, income statement reports, and Internet pages of all major
operating stock and derivative exchanges in Europe covering a 15-year time
period (Annual Reports 1985–1999). In some cases, additional information was
obtained from the exchanges by correspondence. Also various issues of the MSCI
Handbook served as an important source to obtain information on exchange-
specific characteristics. Although reporting schemes and information content of
the financial accounts vary across time and exchange, however, a consistent data
set has been constructed including all necessary information on key balance sheet
and income statement items for 28 individual exchanges, of which 17 exchanges17
over the period from 1985–1999 finally entered the estimations.
4 All national
currencies are converted into U.S. $ and are inflation adjusted using data from
IFS. All variables other than qualitative proxies are expressed in natural
logarithms.
5
As mentioned earlier, financial exchanges are herein regarded as operative
firms. Given the model details in section 4, financial exchanges can thus be
characterised as incurring operating costs, TC, while producing two different
outputs, Q, using two inputs, P, operating in a performing market environment, X.
In terms of the cost structure, total costs are measured as the amount of dollar
value in thousands of operating expenses excluding financial and extra ordinary
items.
The outputs of exchanges used in this study are taken from various issues of
the FIBV Annual Yearbooks (1985–1999). Following Hasan and Malkamäki
(2001) financial exchanges are treated as a type of firm that produces two
different operative transaction services. First, exchanges facilitate trade processing
and matching by providing a centralised trading place or electronic trading
systems. Second, financial exchanges are also engaged in the monitoring of listed
companies and maintenance of the marketplace attempting to ensure that
transactions are fairly and efficiently executed. The output concerning trade
processing can be proxied by using trading statistics, namely the number and
value of executed trades. Proxies for the output regarding the listing procedure of
companies are the number and value of companies listed on a particular exchange.
In line with Hasan and Malkamäki (2001), the number of listed companies and the
value of transactions are identified to be the most appropriate output variables.
6
The input variables for the study include two direct measures of inputs,
namely the price of capital and the price of labour. The price of capital is
measured by taking the sum of capital expenditure, i.e. office expenses, IT and
systems costs, and equipment scaled by the book value of net total office premises
and equipment. The price of labour is calculated as the total expenditures on
employees divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees at the end of
the year.
In addition, the stock market index performance is treated as netput to control
explicitly in the translog function for the performance of the individual stock
market. In order to obtain parametric measures of technical characteristics of the
underlying technology, the above-discussed model accounts the possibility of
technical change. This is achieved by including a linear time trend variable, its
square, and interactions of the other factor inputs and outputs (Coelli, Rao, and
Battese (1998)).
All exogenous variables in this paper considered as potential correlates to
inefficiency are related in various aspects to exchange size, market concentration,
                                                
4 An overview of the panel data sample is provided in table A-1 in the appendix. Not all years are
available for all exchanges. Exchanges with missing variables have been eliminated from the
original database and some observations have been omitted when failing a standard set of criteria
for data quality.
5 See table A-2 for data definition and summury statistics.
6 When regressing total cost on the number and value of transactions and listed companies
respectively, the number of listed companies and the value of transactions perform best in terms of
regression fit. The estimation results are not reported here, since they are consistent with those
found in Hasan and Malkamäki (2001). There might also exist multicollinearity between the
output variables (see also section 6). The estimation focuses on two output proxies, the number of
listed companies and the value of trades.18
institutional organisation, governance structure, and the ability to adopt new
innovative trading technologies.
The first exchange characteristics control for size effects on efficiency. As a
direct measure of exchanges size, the variables, ASSET and CAPITAL, are
included in the regressions. These variables represent the total of financial and
non-financial assets and the total capital of the i–th exchanges for the t–th time
period respectively. It may be argued that larger exchanges have a better ability to
manage exchanges operations. Hence, a negative relationship between exchange
size and inefficiency would be intuitive. The exchange industry is highly
competing to attract market shares and concentrate trading, so it is important to
determine efficiency effects of market concentration and market quality. Several
variables, CONCAP, CONTRADE and VELO are included to control for the
degree of market concentration and market quality. Here, negative coefficients of
these variables are expected. Additionally, the paper considers whether exchange's
age, AGE, is related to efficiency. Following the bank efficiency literature (Berger
and Mester (1997)), one plausible explanation is that exchanges with many years
in the trading service business occupy relatively better position on the learning
curve.
The stochastic frontier model for the technical inefficiency effects of
European stock exchange industry also includes a set of binary explanatory
variables. Some exchanges have expanded their operations to derivative and
settlement business. The first dummy variable, DER, is intended to capture
efficiency differences between stock exchanges that are also involved in
derivatives and securities settlement operations. In the case that an exchange is
engaged in these activities the variable takes a value of one and zero otherwise. It
may be argued that the pooling of diverse trading services and vertical integration
of clearing and settlement activities is inversely related to the overall level of
inefficiency, thus  a negative coefficient is expected.
The next two trading technology variables, ETRADE and REMOTRADE, are
measured by dummy variables to take recent technological innovations and
advances in computerised new trading facilities as well as sophisticated cross-
border securities trading systems into account. These variables are termed as first
and second-generation technologies in electronic equities trading. The first-
generation variable models the switchover from manual to automated execution of
orders. From exchanges annual reports it can be inferred that screen based trading
systems across Europe have been mainly implemented in the 1990's. The advent
of new electronic trading facilities should be related to increasing trading
efficiencies in the securities industry compared to earlier manual processes.
Hence, a negative coefficient is postulated.
Second-generation technologies incorporate further evolution and competition
between security trading systems. Several European stock exchanges launched
cross-boarder electronic trading networks, but some, like the Madrid Stock
Exchange, do not allow to remote membership. Concerning the proxy of remote
access it is less obvious to predict any particular direction, in which the level of
exchange efficiency is determined. Hence, two possible contradicting hypotheses
are formulated. It can be argued that exchanges increase efficient trading and
benefit from offering remote membership, since remote-trading facilities are an
important element of expanding networks and a remedy to enhance liquidity
associated to network effects (Domowitz and Steil (1999)). In this case a negative
coefficient could be hypothesised. Alternatively, developments in more19
sophisticated cross-border trading environments made exchanges facing high
initial investment and implementation cost, especially in the end of the 1990’s.
Although one might expect higher efficiency in order processing and execution
from the creating of cross-border trading systems along time, significant cost
increases can take place in the short run. Overall, no a priori coefficient is
anticipated.
The fourth variable, OWNER, incorporates the ownership structure of stock
exchanges. In pre-automation times, financial exchanges have mostly been
organised as national monopolies owned by their members, i.e. member-firm
brokers and dealers. Traditionally, these exchange members operated necessarily
as transaction intermediaries for those with only limited trading access and
thereby gaining monopolistic profits from exchange transactions (Domowitz and
Steil (1999)). The situation in an automated market is different, where the increase
in competition among exchanges and other electronic networks requires
exchanges to become more efficient and profitable in all their activities. If an
automated exchange can still be organised following the traditional mutual
concept, it is doubtful that such a governance structure is optimal and adaptive
enough in times of intensifying competition among stock exchanges. The
importance of an adequate governance structure has led a number European
exchanges to demutualise with the effect of diminishing member firm’s influence
over commercial activities of the exchange (see Domowitz and Steil (1999) for
further discussion on this issue). Some prominent examples for exchange
demutualisations are Stockholm (1993), Copenhagen (1996), Amsterdam (1997),
and Iceland (1999). Given the need for profitable and efficient strategic
governance decision making in a dynamic competitive environment, the
transformation of exchange governance structure seems to result in a more market
efficient organisation than its mutual counterpart. Thus, the ownership variable,
taking the value one if an exchange has demutualised and zero otherwise, should
be negatively related to exchange inefficiency level.
Summary statistics over the period 1985–1999 and definitions of all relevant
variables in the stochastic frontier and in the inefficiency model are displayed in
table A-2. The data sample covers a wide range of financial exchanges in terms of
size, trading statistics and other characteristics.
6 Empirical results
Before running regression analysis, rank-order correlation has been computed first
in order to address potential multicollinearity problems that may exist between the
considered variables. Table A-3 portrays the correlation of the relevant variables
involved in the different models. Each cell of the upper triangular half of the
matrix contains the coefficient correlation for 28 exchanges in Europe. The lower
triangular matrix provides correlation for the 17 in-sample exchanges for which
efficiency estimates are calculated. The correlation matrix provides useful insights
for the model specifications using different exchange-specific characteristics and
variables. The correlation matrix indicates that the four output variables in the
stochastic cost frontier models, NCOM, VTRADE, VCOM, and NTRADE are
strongly related to each other, as expected. To limit collinearity among these
variables, the paper concentrates in further estimations exclusively on the outputs20
NCOM and VTRADE, as already mentioned earlier. Concerning variables in the
inefficiency model, strong association also applies to the market concentration
proxies, CONCAP and CONTRADE. Hence, only the former enters the
regression estimation and the latter is used to check robustness to substitute for
CONCAP. The correlation coefficients among the dummy variables apparently
suggest no severe multicollinearity problems.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the translog stochastic cost functions
for the pooled sample in equation (4.5), as well as the parameters for the technical
inefficiency effects, are portrayed in table A-4a and A-4b. Asymptotic standard
errors are also reported in the table. All coefficients reveal the expected signs,
except the variable AGE.
Different model specifications and sub-samples were analysed to test the
robustness of the regression results. In the first model, a translog cost frontier
model is estimated comprising two inputs and outputs, as well as a stock market
performance variable and a time trend in linear terms. To determine the efficiency
effects of the selected exchange-specific characteristics in this model, the panel
data structure requires focusing on the sub-sample period 1993–1999. In the
second model, the translog functional form is extended by the cross- and squared
terms of the performance measure and by non-neutral technical change.
Variations in the inefficiency model allow enlarging the time dimension and
making conclusions about the development of inefficiency of European exchanges
over the 15-year time period 1985–1999.
Formal statistical tests are conducted to check significance of the estimated
models. The different hypothesis tests are presented in table 1. All values of the
test statistic that exceed the critical value in this table are significant at the 5
percent level. Given the specifications of the translog frontier of model I, the tests
of hypotheses in the first part of table 1 indicate that the Cobb-Douglas frontier is
rejected as an adequate representation, and the hypothesis of no technical change
is also rejected. However, the hypothesis of no performance effect cannot be
rejected, given the specifications of the translog frontier. Therefore, the preferred










Null hypothesis Log-likelihood λ
2
95 . 0 χ -value Decision
complete model I –5.90
H0: αij = 0 –13.02 14.24 12.59 Reject H0
i,j = 1,2,6,10,11
H0: α10 = 0 –5.41 0.98 3.84 Accept H0
H0: α11 = 0 –14.42 17.05 3.84 Reject H0
H0: γ  = 0 –13.43 15.06 13.40 Reject H0
H0: δ Ii = 0 –13.44 15.07 11.07 Reject H0
i = 1,...,5
complete model II –25.97
H0: αij = 0 –66.35 77.64 25.00 Reject H0
i,j = 1,2,6,10,15
H0: αi = 0 –35.27 18.60 12.59 Reject H0
i = 10,...,14,20
H0: αi = 0 –35.56 16.05 12.59 Reject H0
i = 15,...,20
H0: γ  = 0 –34.93 17.90 11.91 Reject H0
H0: δ IIi = 0 –34.00 16.05 9.49 Reject H0
i = 1,...,4
Notes: The generalised likelihood-ratio test statistic is calculated as λ  = –2{ln[L(H0)]–
ln[L(H1)]} where L(H0) and L(H1) are the values of the likelihood function under the
null and alternative hypotheses, H0 and H1, respectively. The test statistic has
approximately chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
restrictions involved. The likelihood ratio statistic for the test involving γ  = 0  is
asymptotically distributed as a mixed chi-square distribution. The critical value for this
test is obtained from table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986). Values of the test statistic that
exceed the critical value in this table are significant at the 5 per cent level.
The last section of table 1 presents tests of various null hypotheses, given the
specifications of the stochastic frontier with inefficiency effects defined by model
II. The first null hypothesis of the second model, H0: αij = 0, i,j = 1,2,6,10,15, that
the Cobb-Douglas frontier is an appropriate model approximation of European
stock exchanges, is clearly rejected by the data. Also, the second null hypothesis,
H0: αi = 0, i = 10,...,14,20, specifying that stock exchange performance does not
determine the stochastic frontier model is rejected by the data. Likewise, the third
null hypothesis, H0: αi = 0, i = 15,...,20, suggesting that there is no technical
change in European stock exchanges is also rejected at the five per cent level.22
Given the specifications of model II, the preferred frontier model is thus the
frontier with technical change.
7
The estimated parameters of the inefficiency models are of particular interest
to this study. Under the cost frontier formulation in model I, the overall findings
indicate that the size of an exchange is negatively associated to inefficiency. As
expected, larger institutions appear to have better abilities to manage overall
trading service operations. The results for the second group of variables conform
to their a priori expected sign. It is shown that market concentration and market
quality are inversely correlated to inefficiency. The substitution of the variable
CONCAP by CONTRADE alters only slightly the results in the way that overall
inefficiency increases 4.3 per cent. Given the specified frontier model I, it is found
that exchange’s age affect negatively the efficient provision of trading services. At
first sight, this finding appears to be counter-intuitive. A potential explanation of
this finding is that more recently established exchanges may benefit from sharing
trading service experiences from those exchanges with more years in business,
possibly due to technological diffusion.
Given the second inefficiency model, the coefficient of the variable, DER,
reveals a negative sign indicating that exchanges that integrate derivative and
settlement activities seem to have significantly better capabilities in managing
overall costs.
The negative ETRADE coefficient implies that the switchover from floor-
based to automated trading helped stock exchanges to reduce cost inefficiencies.
Interestingly, concerning the variable remote access, REMOTRADE, a significant
positive association related to cost inefficiency is observed. As earlier mentioned,
this result confirms the hypothesis that exchanges incurred recently high initial
establishment costs to offer remote membership access, which in turn do not
lower inefficiencies in the short run, though efficiency gains in the long run are
intuitive.
Finally, the negative coefficient for the variable, OWNER, confirms
statistically significant higher efficiency associated with recent transformations of
exchanges governance structure from a mutually owned into a for-profit investor-
owned companies, which is termed as demutualisation. It supports the view that
the ownership has a direct impact on the management and that a for-profit
exchange can operate more efficiently in order to respond and to adjust adequately
to technological advances and changes in the regulatory and economic
environment.
One striking result of the model estimations is that the γ  coefficient indicate
that residual variation is partly due to the inefficiency effect, uit. In both cases, the
null hypothesis that inefficiency effects are absent from the model, γ  = 0,  is
                                                
7 It can be argued that the production technology may also depend on whether the exchanges are
involved in derivative and settlement activities. Hence, if they do not follow the same cost
function, it is not proper to pool derivative and stock exchanges. In order to test for pooling for
stock and derivative exchanges, the translog cost frontier in equation (4.5) was extended by binary
variables taking the value of one if the exchanges is engaged in these businesses and zero
otherwise. The models were estimated with the included dummy variables. The LR-test for the
null hypothesis did not exceed the critical value of the chi-square distribution at the five per cent
level indicating that the structure of the cost functions does not differ significantly, and that the
data for derivative and stock exchanges in the sample could be pooled.
     Although differences in the cost structure for derivative and stock exchanges are statistically
insignificant, evidence is found that diversification in the provision of trading activity matters
when explaining inefficiencies among exchanges.23
rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance. Furthermore, the one-sided
generalised likelihood-ratio tests of H0: δ Ii = 0,  i = 1,...,5,  and  H0: δ IIi = 0,
i = 1,...,4, reveal statistics, which exceed the 5 per cent critical value respectively.
Hence, as mentioned by Battese and Coelli (1995), this proves that the joint
effects of the exchange specific characteristics on the inefficiencies of trading
service production are significant, although the individual effects of one or more
of the variables may not have a statistically significant impact.
The technical inefficiency scores of European financial exchanges under the
different model specifications were predicted. In respect to model Ia and Ib, the
mean technical inefficiency scores were found to be 0.2601 and 0.2114
respectively. Although the models IIa and IIb are statistical different, technical
inefficiencies of European financial exchanges were estimated alternatively under
the translog frontier specification with and without technical change. Descriptive
statistics as well as individual mean inefficiency scores of each exchange under
the above-discussed model specifications IIa and IIb are reported in table 2.
Observing the predicted inefficiency scores over the entire sample and period, the
combined estimate indicates that an average financial exchange in Europe
experiences a cost inefficiency score of 0.2888 under the preferred frontier
specification. A closer look on five-year sub-samples makes evident that the
average level of cost efficiency has improved over time. Concerning the five-year
sub-samples 1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, the mean cost-inefficiency
scores decreased considerably over time and came down from 0.4520, 0.3223, to
the lowest score of 0.2302 reported in the second half of the 1990s.
Furthermore, inefficiency scores have been calculated for three different
panels. The classification of the exchanges has been made according to the value
of market capitalisation of the respective stock market. For example, the first
panel includes the five leading European markets, namely Amsterdam, Frankfurt,
Madrid, London, and Paris, while the others comprise medium and smaller
exchanges. The evidence reveals average inefficiency scores for the top 5,
medium, and smallest exchanges of 0.2329, 0.3059, and 0.3319 respectively.
These scores suggest that larger exchanges operate more efficiently relative to the
group of smaller exchanges. In the first part of table 2, disaggregated results
provide information on the inefficiency level of the individual stock exchanges.
When interpreting the ranking of the inefficiency scores, one should bear in mind







Exchange Model IIa Exchange Model IIb
Swiss Exchange 0.0345 Euronext Brussels 0.0293
Euronext Brussels 0.0408 Swiss Exchange 0.0295
Euronext Amsterdam 0.0466 Budapest Stock Exchange 0.0310
Budapest Stock Exchange 0.0466 Euronext Amsterdam 0.0314
Deutsche Börse AG 0.0719 Deutsche Börse AG 0.0922
Barcelona Stock Exchange 0.0845 Barcelona Stock Exchange 0.1024
Copenhagen Stock Exchange 0.1915 Helsinki Stock Exchanges 0.1684
Tallinn Stock Exchange 0.1955 Bourse de Luxembourg 0.2027
Bolsa de Madrid 0.2235 Iceland Stock Exchange 0.2139
Bourse de Luxembourg 0.2606 Tallinn Stock Exchange 0.2156
Helsinki Stock Exchanges 0.3365 Bolsa de Madrid 0.2221
Euronext Paris 0.3924 Copenhagen Stock Exchange 0.2267
OM Stockholm Exchange 0.4136 Euronext Paris 0.2459
Iceland Stock Exchange 0.4258 London Stock Exchange 0.2495
Oslo Bors 0.4489 Oslo Bors 0.2535
London Stock Exchange 0.4629 OM Stockholm Exchange 0.2652
Wiener Börse 0.5288 Wiener Börse 0.6356
1985–1989 0.4520 1985–1989 0.2245
1990–1994 0.3223 1990–1994 0.1753
1995–1999 0.2302 1995–1999 0.1891
combined 1985–1999 0.2888 combined 1985–1999 0.1885
top 5






a) 0.3319 smallest 5
a) 0.2478
Notes: The estimates in this table are average and individual inefficiency scores of
European financial exchanges over the time period 1985–1999. The coefficients are
listed in ascending order so that those stock exchanges with the lowest inefficiency level
are ranked first. Note that an accurate interpretation of these scores is valid only under
the specific stochastic frontier formulations. a) the grouping of the stock exchanges is
constructed according to the value of capitalisation of the respective market.
Overall, there is little effect on the average level or dispersion of cost inefficiency
across the model variation, although the preferred model with non-neutral
technical change in the stochastic frontier exhibits some higher inefficiency
scores. A breakdown of the estimated cost efficiencies on exchange- individual
level also shows that the ranking of exchanges according to their efficiency is also
robust to model variations.
Aggregated results expose decreasing inefficiency over time. The histograms
in figure A-2a and A-2b depict the distribution of exchanges with their
corresponding technical inefficiency scores over the entire time period. Both
graphs reveal an asymmetric distribution of technical inefficiency scores pointing
towards efficiency progress over time. It is apparent that most of the exchanges
have predicted inefficiencies in the interval 0.3000 observed in the period 1985–
1989. However, the majority of stock exchanges were able to improve
substantially technical efficiencies over the last decade, so that most observations
can be found in the inefficiency range close to 0.1000 in the last five-year time
interval.25
It can be summarised from empirical evidence that changes in the governance
structure, market concentration and quality, as well as developments in new
trading technologies are associated with improved cost efficiency among
European stock exchanges. Disaggregated results exhibit a better ability of larger
exchanges to manage costs in a more efficient manner relative to their smaller
competitors. In addition, evidence reveals that diversification in trading activities
experience higher cost efficiency.
7 Conclusions
Despite important structural changes in modern global and European financial
exchange markets mainly due to technological developments, a changing
regulatory environment, and continuing globalisation, relatively little is known
about the impact of such forces acting on the efficient organisation of these
markets. The paper provides novel insights in the microstructure of European
financial exchanges and extents related empirical work in this area in several
ways. The innovation includes the use of a translog stochastic frontier model to
quantify technical efficiency effects among financial exchanges. Moreover, the
present study employs a single stage approach to estimate inefficiency effects.
Furthermore, the study evaluates the organisation of exchange institution
efficiency in a European context, since increasing competition among stock
exchanges is a recent and quite acute phenomenon, especially in Europe. The
paper makes also a first attempt to analyse potential correlates helping to explain
variations from the efficient frontier. The estimations are based on a unique
unbalanced panel data set considering all major European financial exchanges
during the years 1985–1999.
Overall evidence suggests that, on average, European financial exchanges
operate at a 20–25 per cent higher cost level compared to the efficient benchmark
exchange. The estimates also indicate that European exchanges have experienced
steady improvements in their relative technical efficiency scores over the sample
period. Nevertheless, it was found that in more recent years trading service
providers in Europe still operate at a significant less efficient level than the
predicted benchmark. Graphical evidence on the distribution of inefficiency
scores over the sample period is consistent with the finding of substantially
increasing but persisting differences in technical efficiency among European
exchanges. Moreover, sub-sample results show that large exchanges outperform
their smaller counterparts in terms of higher efficiency. With the incorporation of
efficiency effects, the paper also contributes to examine the relationship between
exchange institution efficiency and organisational form. Accordingly, the
presented evidence suggests that exchanges operating efficiency is related to size
effects, ownership form, trading quality and market concentration, integration of
other trading activities, and first generation automated trade execution
technologies, though no efficiency enhancing effect was found for the years in
business and second generation cross-border trading facilities at the current stage.
What can be inferred from the presented results concerning future prospects
for an integrated common European security market? One plausible implication in
the light of the ongoing discussion about the fragmented European exchange
industry is that the formation of mergers or alliances among exchanges may have26
a beneficial effect on the market if they enhance efficiency improvements and
permit exchanges to take advantage of scale economies. As well, the creation of
alliances among exchanges would also enable co-operating exchanges to share
high establishment and development cost of new electronic trading technologies
which might lead to greater system efficiency. The trend towards concentration of
exchange markets in Europe is well paving its way, but considerable room for
improvement remains to attain an efficient market organisation of the European
trading landscape. In this respect, regulators are challenged to create and ensure a
stable European regulatory system that is flexible enough to adjust adequately to
future technological and market developments. First initiatives in this direction
have already been achieved by a recent agreement on a new legislative process for
the European securities market based on the reports of the Committee of Wise
Men (2001).27
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Athens Stock Exchange 1997–1999
Barcelona Stock Exchange 1992–1995
Bolsa de Bilbao 1992–1999
Bolsa de Madrid 1995–1999
Bolsa de Valencia 1989–1990, 1992–1999
Euronext Brussels 1991–1999
Copenhagen Stock Exchange 1992–1999
Deutsche Börse AG 1991–1999
Helsinki Stock Exchanges 1985–1999
Istanbul Stock Exchange 1995–1999
Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa/Porto 1997–1998
London Stock Exchange 1989–1999
Ljubljana Stock Exchange 1990–1999
Bourse de Luxembourg 1993–1999
Malta Stock Exchange 1992–1999
Oslo Bors 1987–1999
Euronext Paris 1990–1999
OM Stockholm Exchange 1985–1999
Swiss Exchange 1996–1999
Wiener Börse 1993–1999
Warsaw Stock Exchange 1993–1999
Irish Stock Exchange 1996–1998
Tallinn Stock Exchange 1996–1999
Budapest Stock Exchange 1997–1999
Prague Stock Exchange 1992–1999
Iceland Stock Exchange 1989–1999














Total operating expenses of the
i–th exchange in the t–th time
period
47583 84315
Q1 NCOM Number of companies listed on





Total value of shares traded on





Total number of issued shares of
domestic companies on the i–th
exchange in the t–th period
multiplied by their respective
prices at a given time
323000 1360000
Q4 NTRADE Total number of trades dealt on





Total capital expenditures, i.e.
office expenses, IT and systems
costs, and equipment, scaled by
the book value of net total office
premises and equipment of the






Total expenditures on employees
divided by the number of
employees for the i–th exchange
in the t–th time period
69.8381 33.6582
X SMI (%) Stock index performance of the
i–th exchange and the t–th time
period
136.45 235.81
T TIME Time trend
ZI1 ASSET
(thousands US $)
Total of financial and non-
financial assets of the i–th




Total capital of the i–th exchange
in the t–th time period
56716 92101
ZI3a CONCAP(%) Market concentration of five per
cent of the most capitalised
domestic companies compared
with the total market
capitalisation of domestic
companies on the i–th exchange
in the t–th time period
56.72 13.9232









Variable Definition Mean Standard
Deviation
ZI3b CONTRADE (%) Market concentration of the five
per cent most traded domestic
companies compared with the
total turnover value of domestic
companies on the i–th exchange
in the t–th time period (only
employed to test robustness to
substitute for Concap)
58.71 16.27
ZI4 AGE (years) Number of years the i–th
exchange is in business
129 95
ZI5 VELO (%) Turnover velocity is the
annualised ratio between
turnover of domestic shares and
their market capitalisation for the
i–th exchange in the t–th time
period
72.61 36.69
ZII1 DER Dummy, equals one if the i–th
exchange is involved in
derivative activities in the t–th
time period, otherwise zero
0.18 0.39
ZII2 ETRADE Dummy, equals one if the i–th
exchange has switched from
materialised to automated trade
execution, otherwise zero
0.23 0.42
ZII3 REMOTRADE Dummy, equals one if the i–th
exchange allows remote access,
otherwise zero
0.02 0.13




Note: All currencies are converted into uniform U.S. $ measures and all variables other
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model Ia Model Ib
Variable Parameter Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Cost frontier model
constant α0 –0.57751 1.55780 –0.25472 2.41705
lnQ1 α1 –1.09787 0.94573 –0.78178 0.77644
lnQ2 α2 0.03550 0.29413 0.07756 0.24715
lnQ1lnQ1 α11 0.21935 0.14497 0.18521 0.13706
lnQ2lnQ2 α22 0.05243 0.01794 0.04904 0.01734
lnQ1lnQ2 α12 –0.06711 0.10398 –0.07320 0.08522
lnP1 β 1 1.55569 0.88643 1.05791 0.76731
lnP1lnP1 β 11 0.23353 0.08534 0.23195 0.08825
lnP1lnQ1 η1 0.01177 0.15573 0.03933 0.15458
lnP1lnQ2 η2 –0.22214 0.07747 –0.20313 0.07551
lnX1 ξ x 0.03607 0.03136 ––
T τ t –0.00736 0.14421 0.03366 0.02645
Inefficiency model
constant δ 0 0.23859 1.18526 0.14735 0.90650
ZI1 δ 1 –0.41243 0.07815 –0.29894 0.10277
ZI2 δ 2 –0.02873 0.07156 0.00735 0.06092
ZI3 δ 3 –0.26162 0.31307 –0.32451 0.30219
ZI4 δ 4 1.14005 0.27975 0.99337 0.30068












u /σ σ = γ 0.38450 0.11658 0.20794 0.14444
no. obs. 63 63
loglikelihood function –5.90068 –5.40985













Model IIa Model IIb
Variable Parameter Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Cost frontier model
constant α0 3.71391 1.00412 1.96470 1.01886
lnQ1 α1 1.81288 0.84271 1.19762 1.13282
lnQ2 α2 0.49716 0.32433 0.64152 0.45613
lnQ1lnQ1 α11 0.10823 0.13342 0.16075 0.13217
lnQ2lnQ2 α22 –0.01045 0.02125 –0.01066 0.01937
lnQ1lnQ2 α12 –0.05995 0.10259 –0.08023 0.09584
lnP1 β 1 1.06772 0.41018 1.08693 0.46058
lnP1lnP1 β 11 –0.07049 0.03812 –0.06180 0.03492
lnP1lnQ1 η1 –0.17459 0.11332 –0.12612 0.09616
lnP1lnQ2 η2 0.03619 0.05642 –0.00333 0.05158
lnX1 ξ x –3.92987 0.65299 –2.95774 0.72699
lnX1lnX1 ξ xx 0.09878 0.23958 0.27263 0.14021
lnX1lnQ1 κ 1 –0.43630 0.31639 –0.24917 0.20767
lnX1lnQ2 κ 2 0.13930 0.14546 0.06463 0.09431
lnX1lnP1 λ 1 –0.40349 0.12904 –0.16338 0.10177
T τ t 0.00653 0.16601 ––
TT τ tt –0.00632 0.00568 ––
TlnQ1 ρ 1 0.02539 0.05327 ––
TlnQ2 ρ 2 –0.01323 0.02568 ––
TlnP1 ψ 1 0.05991 0.02340 ––
TlnX1 ω t 0.10790 0.08211 ––
Inefficiency model
constant δ 0 0.38874 0.12887 0.19896 0.34351
ZII1 δ 1 –0.88022 0.29144 –0.78877 0.67600
ZI12 δ 2 –0.29637 0.23761 –0.48444 0.29189
ZI13 δ 3 1.06091 0.33806 1.10336 0.34520












u /σ σ = γ 0.25945 0.23094 0.15896 0.82624
no. obs. 109 109
loglikelihood –25.97486 –35.55705
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